A surprising connection on the professional network. A proposal of employment from a recruiter, probably a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 on the side preparing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company peppered with “non-public” or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem clear, on this telling, that an element about this method would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – leading the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of ten thousand over the preceding two and a half years, seeking governmental, industrial, military and technological classified information. But a fresh initiative targeting elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to act again.
A spying alert was issued on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a single slide after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.
Security Strategy and Legislative Updates
In the typical manner of British intelligence, there was no official release of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service knew its briefing note would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press helps the wider public more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of uncovering more information from in and around Westminster, though that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service aims for public figures to understand that just because exchanges on professional networks are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, although the recent actions occur after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of working for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced previous legislation led to warnings that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Laws and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a reminder of its replacement: “Individuals involved in spying operations face significant criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” It is a crime if a person engages in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is not a government minister will have restricted knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Methodological Differences and Persistent Digital Threats
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export intelligence collection methods and the scale of its spy network is enormous, employing 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
Beijing is prepared to develop people over the extended period and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis told MPs on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the government situation may mean an individual rapidly marginal becomes significant.
Another way to think about the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the Western nations at a threshold under the level of direct conflict. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is engaged in persistent attempts to identify covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.
